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ABSTRACT
The purpose of this study is to interpret the actions 
of Edwin M. Stanton in the wake of the Lincoln 
assassination, based on his personality characteristics and 
behavioral history.
The writer examined the principal evidence gathered by 
various writers that suggested that Stanton was involved in 
the assassination.
A study of Stanton’s personality and behavioral 
history reveals that the characteristics of fear and 
anxiety were predominant and produced other characteristics 
such as deceit, vindictiveness, secrecy, and insubord­
ination. Stanton’s fear of the rebel conspiracy was so 
pervasive that it dominated his personality during the war 
years.
Many of the actions Stanton took in the wake of the 
assassination fit easily into his personality framework, 
including such items as the midnight burial of Booth and the 
abnormal security precautions taken with respect to the 
Lincoln conspirators.
The results of this study suggest that Edwin M.
Stanton did not play any kind of role in the conspiracy to 
kill Lincoln, but that his unusual actions can be 
understood only within the context of his own unique 
personality.
EDWIN M. STANTON AND THE LINCOLN ASSASSINATION
INTRODUCTION
Psychohistory, as it is generally known, encompasses a 
wide variety of analytical approaches. Traditionally, 
historians sought to record merely what had happened and 
why. A disastrous diplomatic move by a world leader, would 
be explained by reference to that leader’s insatiable 
ambition or stubbornness. The origins of that ambition or 
stubbornness, which lie in the individual psyche, were 
either ignored or subjected to ’’armchair” psychology. It 
is to the question of psychological motivation in history 
that psychohistory addresses itself. Psychohistory picks 
up where traditional history ends, pursuing the true 
origins of personality traits and their effect on 
historical figures and events. This field of endeavor began 
by applying the childhood traumas, drives, and defenses 
discovered by Freud to historical figures. Though this 
approach continues, as evidenced by the Journal of Psycho- 
history (formerly History of Childhood Quarterly), various 
newer approaches have captured the imagination of 
psychohistorians. Particular attention will be given to 
the forms most appropriate to the type of analysis this 
thesis employs.
2
3A standard approach to the study of political leaders 
is found in "personality studies." Promoted by political 
biographers like Fred Greenstein, these studies first 
discuss the "phenomenology" of a person, or his personality 
traits and characteristics. The second stage consists of 
identifying the personality dynamics of a leader, or the 
syndromes suggested by his characteristics and how they 
interact with the societal environment. Finally, a 
personality study forms a genetic hypothesis of the 
individual, which is an identification of the origins of 
those traits or syndromes.^ In general, psychological 
method is introduced in the second and third stages. The 
first stage has been used by historians since Thucydides,
at least by those who have bothered to describe the 
character of historical figures. The most prominent study 
using the Greenstein model is Woodrow Wilson and Colonel 
House by Alexander and Juliette George.
The Georges summed up Wilson’s personality traits in a 
research note attached at the end of the work. They found 
that he displayed a compulsive, insatiable ambition, as 
well as a lust for power, whether he was President of 
Princeton University or of the United States.2 The dynamic 
analysis of Wilson’s traits described his pursuit of power 
and ambition as compensatory devices for a feeling of 
inadequacy and inferiority.3 His need to dominate any 
endeavor in which he was involved often crippled his
4ability to maneuver and compromise, which he knew to be 
imperatives of the political process. Certain measures 
became a test of personal worth, on which he could not give 
an inch. Such feelings quickly transcended the immediate 
political task at hand.4 An example was Wilson’s effort to 
win approval for the League of Nations in 1919* When his 
enemies bottled up the League in the Senate with a demand 
for reservations, he would not budge. It became an 
intensely personal battle that he waged to its bitter and 
self-defeating end, when compromise would have carried the 
day.
The genetic hypothesis put forward by the Georges 
traces Wilson’s traits and personality dynamics to feelings 
of inadequacy and inferiority developed in his childhood. 
Wilson’s father unceasingly criticized Woodrow and made 
sarcastic barbs whenever his son failed to achieve 
perfection. This exacting form of domination by his 
father, and the inferiority it generated, drove Wilson in 
his later years to abhor and resist the demands of others. 
”He was assuredly driven to his passionate stubbornness by 
the irresistible, never-articulated need to retaliate 
against the kind of domination he had once endured at the 
hands of his father.”5 Thus, he could not bow to the 
demands of the Senate and Henry Cabot Lodge without 
destroying the core of his personal integrity.
5Many historians hailed the Georges’ analysis as a 
superb example of psychohistorical work; yet criticism of 
it continues because of the presumptive nature of the 
genetic analysis. As Bernard Brodie has noted, "it is one 
thing to observe compulsive behavior and identify it for 
what it is; it is quite another to find the original 
causes."7 Even Greenstein wondered whether genetic 
analysis was worth the effort, given the less equivocal 
nature of the phenomenology and dynamic stages.8 Historian 
Page Smith agreed that the shaky speculations about 
Wilson’s relationship with his father really ”do not in the 
end add to our understanding of his triumphs and his 
ultimate tragedy.”9 Thus, even in a superb work like the 
Georges', one can validly question the necessity and value 
of extending an overview of personality into a 
psychological explanation of inner motivation.
Another approach to psychohistory is the "repetition 
compulsion" method employed and deveoped by Rudolph Binion. 
Binion applied this particular "traumatic mechanism" to 
Belgium's King Leopold and his neutrality policy in the 
years prior to World War I. The King subconsciously led 
his nation to diplomatic and military disaster as a 
repetition of a traumatic car accident years earlier, in 
which he was the driver and his wife a fatal victim.
Binion also used his theory to explain Hitler's philosophy 
and leadership. Hitler is alleged to have had a
6subconscious desire to lead his nation into another world
war as a repetition of World War I, which had reawakened
traumatic feelings from Hitler’s childhood. His Jewish
policy was an effort to replay and finally expunge the
guilt he felt at directing a Jewish doctor to administer
fatal medicine to his m o t h e r . T h e  repetition theory is a
classic example of the presumptive nature of psychoanalytic
theory, for Binion based much of his work on Freud’s
theories. On the issue of the absence of documentary
evidence, Binion argued that "no amount or kind of evidence
1 2can turn a psychohistorical insight into an inference.”
Another emerging area of the psychohistorical field is 
cognitive psychohistory. This approach seeks to determine 
the process by which men and women make sense of their 
society and formulate responses to its stimuli. 13 Often 
this involves identifying operational belief systems in 
order to reveal the underlying motives of political 
leaders. These determinations are much more verifiable 
since documentary evidence plays a large part in forming 
them. Given that the aim of such analysis is the 
cognitive, or conscious, functions of the particular person 
or group, the instinctual origins of psychoanalytic theory 
rarely come into play. In fact, historians have used 
cognitive psychohistory, without rigid guidelines, for 
years.14 Trait psychohistory is a related approach, one 
that merely seeks the underlying personality components of
7historical action. In general, traits are organized into 
certain specific categories of character types and 
individual actions are then predicted given the character 
and the situation presented. This is especially useful in 
group analysis, and has been applied to the revolutionary' 
movement in Colonial A m e r i c a . ^ 5
Cognitive and trait psychohistory are part of a 
broader category of descriptive psychological analysis, 
which has found greater favor in the historical profession 
than any other type of psychohistorical approach. As 
mentioned earlier, descriptive psychology is very distinct 
from analytic psychology, which deals with instinct and 
hidden impulses. Faye Crosby has called this approach 
"coherent whole explanation.”^  These explanations aim to 
make plain a given pattern of behavior within an individual 
or group, to state the meaning of a set of behaviors or 
events. Nonsensical behavior is analyzed to determine its 
consistency with prior behavioral or trait patterns of 
individuals and groups. Crosby outlines a five-step 
procedure for doing descriptive psychohistory: 1) document
the behavior and events, 2) justify the presence of 
psychological factors, 3) identify the factors and discount 
other probable factors, 4) present a concise explanation, 
and 5) reconcile contradictions.^
Descriptive psychohistory is closest to the analytical 
approach used in this thesis. As a result of the flaws in
a!■ 8 
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psychohistory in general, which will be reviewed in a 
moment, this thesis rejects an explicit use of any of the 
above theories. Since the purpose of this thesis is solely 
to explain the odd events that occurred after Lincoln's 
assassination, the focus will be on identifying prior 
behavior by Secretary of War Stanton which makes his 
actions during the assassination period consistent with his 
own personality, if not reality itself. The objective will 
be to refute notions that Stanton was involved in the 
conspiracy, while giving a satisfactory explanation of his 
irrational behavior. While this sounds like "coherent 
whole explanation," it will reject clinical categories and 
syndromes for common descriptions of character and
personality (secretiveness, vindictiveness, etc.). Of 
course, we are not concerned with why Stanton developed 
these characteristics, so no psychoanalytic or genetic 
analysis will be involved. The reason why this traditional 
approach is maintained, and theory and method rejected, is 
found in the criticisms outlined below.
Criticism of the psychohistorical approach has been 
extensive. Jacques Barzun, perhaps the most voc-al critic, 
attacked the basic premise that psychology can be an 
element of historical analysis. He emphasizes the extreme 
complexity of historical causation, noting that the whole 
purpose of writing history is to show "the vagarious 
disorder of human affairs, the force of the irrational, the
9unstructured character of the past, and the futility of
trying to make it say something unshakable in answer to
system and method."18 Stressing instead an intuitive
handling of historical evidence, Barzun argues that
historical writing is the very "counterpart of method,
equally sound and particularly heal th-giving."1 9 The
reader of history should not be consigned "to a siege of
Hineinstudieren." much less to a weighing of "pros and cons
20
among the dubities and contradictions of rival systems." 
While Barzun is consistent in his criticism of method 
(quantitative analysis is attacked as well), few historians 
have been prepared to dismiss psychohistory so readily; 
they focus instead on several specific, serious problems 
with its application.
Evidentiary problems, for instance, are particularly 
striking in this field. As Erik Erikson admitted, 
psychohistorians must be prepared "to relinquish the 
security of seemingly more objective methods."21 Though 
Erikson tried to establish rigorous, austere criteria for 
"psychohistorical evidence," such standards are not 
commonly observed in practice.22 Bruce Mazlish, another 
careful psychohistorian, opined that "the application of 
psychoanalytic method to patients who are dead. . .and 
which analysis must proceed in terms of a one-way Socratic 
dialogue with their remaining documents is fraught with 
dangers."23 What these psychohistorians quite admirably
10
realized was that their approach often employs a heavy 
ratio of theory to historical fact. Rudolph Binion argues 
that this is irrelevant, that "soft data may yield solid, 
and hard data shaky conclusions."^ Barzun disagrees, 
countering that psychohistory cannot be properly challenged 
and criticized once it steps off "the common ground of 
evidence.
Psychoanalysts agree that psychohistory has serious 
evidentiary problems, for the simple reason that 
biographers can rarely retrieve enough information on their 
subjects to do a proper analysis.26 Secondary material is 
scant, and diaries and letters often record only moods. 
Dream material is extremely rare. Compared to the 
information obtained during the course of therapy with a 
view toward completeness, the written material concerning 
historical figures is essentially negligible.27 Into the 
void of fact, psychohistorians introduce theory and method. 
While theory is not an adequate substitute for data, 
psychohistorians compound the problem by using it to twist 
data in analogical and metaphorical w a y s . Thus, the data 
is of no intrinsic importance; rather it serves as a 
convenient "hanger" for a theoretical message. In the end, 
"bold assertion, emphatic reiteration, clincical 
anecdotage, and a richly metaphorical terminology all 
contribute to masking the paucity of empirical 
verification. n29
11
Evidentiary weaknesses result in another major
problem - reductionism. As Gerald Izenberg describes it,
hypotheses about early developments in a person’s life, for
which there is no evidence, are ’’speculatively deduced from
30adult events and then used to explain those events.” 
Psychohistorical explanations transform all outward or 
public behavior into the product of intrapsychic 
conflict.31 Reducing historical events to the product of 
deterministic, neurotic mechanisms is widely seen as a 
problem by psychohistorians themselves. Norman Brown, in 
fact, argues that psychoanalytic method is truly a way out 
of history.32 yet Erikson and Mazlish argue that 
psychology and history need not be exclusive, while 
recognizing the existence of reductionism. Of course, 
Barzun is particularly eloquent on this issue, claiming 
that psychohistory seeks to ’’dispose of history and 
civilization, of human error and achievement, rather then 
contemplate them.”33
As a result of these criticisms, many practitioners in 
the field have reconsidered many of the bolder approaches. 
This reevaluation consists of giving greater weight to ego 
and reality factors and less weight to drives and 
defenses.34- Efforts to integrate sociology with 
psychoanalytic theory are being encouraged by 
psychobiographers like Fred Weinstein and Gerald Platt.35 
Part of the impetus behind this reform lies in the
12
realization that the psychological models of human 
development constructed by Erik Erikson and others in the 
twentieth century are inappropriate for historical social 
contexts. How does one apply these models "to ages that 
knew endemic famine, awoke and went to sleep with the sun, 
and suffered extremes of heat and cold as a norm?"36 
Lawrence Stone has argued that four of the main traumas 
Freud found to be universal among his patients "are 
dependent on particular experiences which did not happen to 
the vast majority of people in most of the recorded 
past."37 Consequently, psychohistorical work in the future 
is likely to take greater account of external social 
pressures than in the past.
Some criticism has been directed toward the state of 
flux in both the fields of psychology and psychohistory.
The historian, and much more so his reader, are faced with 
a myriad "rival and contradictory theories of human 
development from among which he must choose an initial 
hypothesis."38 The answers that result from the different 
theories vary radically. This is not to say that 
traditional approaches to history are free of criticism. 
Rather, in the psychohistorical context, it is particularly 
striking how the same evidence yields opposite results 
depending upon the model used. What might be repetitious 
phenomena to Binion could be classic drives phenomena to 
Llyod DeMause. As was mentioned earlier, psychoanalysts do
13
not even believe a marriage between psychology and history 
is possible. Thus, we have come full circle.
Psychohistory must divorce itself from fact, which often 
makes it reductionist. The discussion about accuracy then 
becomes one for the psychoanalysts, who do not believe the 
union with history is possible. This confusion within 
psychohistory suggests that a limited version of 
personality analysis may be more appropriate in most 
contexts.
A limited approach need not sacrifice the goal of
effective historical interpretation. Eugene Genovese has
concluded that the psychological element of interpretation,
39while perhaps correct, is essentially irrelevant.
Knowing whether a guilt complex or a subconscious 
repetition is responsible for a leader's actions is 
unlikely to add much to our historical knowledge. Thus, 
many historians argue for a retreat to some sort of 
psychohistorical empiricism or cognitive d i s s o n a n c e . 4-0 
While personality can be extremely important in 
understanding historical events, divining why the 
personality came about is tangential to the task of 
historical explanation in most cases. What is required is 
the first stage of the Weinstein model, phenomenology, and 
half of the second, dynamics. Identifying the personality 
traits and organizing Stanton's display of them in 
situational contexts will serve as an adequate basis for
uexplaining his actions after the assassination.
Explanation of motive, or genetic analysis, will be avoided 
as unnecessary.
Psychohistorians might not accept this disavowal of 
their methods. Erikson noted that historians often disavow 
the use of psychology and then proceed to make superficial 
psychological statements throughout their work.4-1 William 
Langer's call for the application of psychology to history 
in 1957 recognized that historians indulged freely in 
psychological interpretation, by virtue of a "general 
humanistic appreciation of personality."4-2 Other writers 
agree that "a historian can scarcely compose a narrative 
line without committing himself, implicitly or explicitly,
to- some theory of personality and motivation."4-3 
Nevertheless, historians should be able to identify 
personality traits and characteristics, based on available 
documentation, and explain their relevance to historical 
actions. Saying, for instance, that Napoleon refused to 
compromise because he was stubborn and ambitious should not 
require an application of theory and method. It permits 
testing and criticism from other historians who read the 
evidence differently. Of course, some topics may admit of 
no other alternative than motivational inquiry. But when, 
as with this topic, there is no need for such analysis, it 
can and should be avoided.
15
As we saw earlier, some psychohistorians like 
Greenstein have admitted the force of the argument that 
biographers can be more effective by leaving out the 
speculative genetic or developmental analysis. Traditional 
historians like Don Fehrenbacher feel that illuminating 
historical data with psychological insight can be useful, 
while data pressed into theoretical molds is of no use at 
all .UU Psychological inquiries which describe instead of 
explain can be beneficial in historical research without 
the patent dangers psychohistory has traditionally 
presented. The historian must be careful not to allow the 
descriptive function to become a vehicle for "armchair 
theorizing.” But if he limits himself to a desriptive 
study of personality traits, the historian should be able 
to explain most historical events requiring a look at 
personality.
Some readers might prefer to label this thesis a form 
of psychohistory, despite its limited objective. 
Nevertheless, what any psychohistorical work "ought to do 
depends, in turn, on what it aims to do."4-5 This thesis 
seeks only to explain the actions of Secretary of War 
Stanton after the Lincoln assassination, based on 
identifiable personality traits observed over the course of 
his career. It argues that Stanton’s behavior is 
consistent with his personality profile, thus alleviating 
the need for any motivational inquiry. In many ways, this
16
thesis parallels the work of Gamiliel Bradford at the turn 
of the century. In works like Union Portraits, Bradford 
produced what he called ’’psychographs.” Whatever he might 
have meant by that, they were essentially personality 
portraits of historical figures, assimilating the many 
traits passed over by standard biographers. In some ways, 
too, this thesis will remind the reader of the work of 
Steven Allen and Peter Hoffer, who assembled personality 
traits of revolutionary Americans and linked them to public 
behavior during the 1770’ s.4-6
This thesis, in essence, stands on its own foundation. 
No other personality study will be exactly like it, nor 
should it be. Each study must depend for its form on the 
data available, the events explained, and the historical 
context. The Lincoln Assassination was a unique event.
Some writers originally suggested that Stanton may have 
played a role in the conspiracy. Others (the vast majority 
today) refute this idea by accepting Stanton’s behavior as 
rational and appropriate. Neither conclusion is 
satisfactory. This thesis will put to rest the conspiracy 
theory for good, while at the same time recognizing and 
explaining the vagaries of Stanton’s character and how they 
related to his behavior. It will not involve still another 
belabored review of the assassination; rather it will 
assume a good deal of knowledge on the reader’s part.
17
A few notes of caution are in order. The nature of 
this study does not allow a complete biography of Stanton, 
nor a completely balanced view of his tenure as Secretary 
of War. Stanton displayed several noble characteristics 
during his public career, for which he will receive little 
credit in this study. Only those traits relevant to the 
assassination period will be discussed. Also, to the 
extent possible, information about Stanton is included only 
if it appears in more than one contemporary source or is 
derived from Stanton’s personal communications. Since the 
latter are rarely plentiful, his actions will be viewed 
primarily through the eyes of others. A sincere attempt 
has been made to screen the personal prejudices of those 
contemporaries and to use the accounts given by Stanton’s 
political allies whenever feasible.
Finally, this thesis makes no grand claims. It seeks 
to light one candle of historical interpretation in the 
vast darkness that one hundred and twenty years have cast 
on the melancholy events of April, 1865. To the extent 
that it succeeds in doing so, the study of personality will 
emerge as a strong scholarly complement to biography and 
psychohistory.
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CHAPTER I 
STANTON AND THE HISTORIANS
As the gallows neared completion, the hammering must 
have seemed incessant.to Anna Surratt. Each blow which 
reverberated through the Arsenal grounds represented 
another nail in the coffin of her mother, sentenced to hang 
for aiding and abetting the assassination of Abraham 
Lincoln. As Anna waited anxiously with friends under a hot 
July sun for news of a last-minute reprieve, the injustice 
of it all was too much for her. She could not help but 
wonder why. Was her mother the victim of a tragic judicial 
mistake? Was she the victim of an anti-Southern hysteria? 
Was she the victim of malevolent men in the War Department? 
Or was she the victim of her own knowledge, the kind of 
information which could implicate high Union officials in 
the assassination conspiracy?
The latter explanation has been repeated often in 
popular writings about the assassination, and has been the 
vehicle for implicating Edwin M. Stanton in the murder 
plot. Though whisperings were often heard about Radical 
complicity the first seventy-five years after the 
assassination, it was in 1939 that Otto Eisenschiml opened 
the debate about Edwin M. Stanton. In Why Was Lincoln
21
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Murdered?, Eisenschiml suggested that Stanton may have 
been behind the assassination. All subsequent work on the 
subject has taken Eisenschiml’s questions into account and 
therefore his thesis deserves close scrutiny.
Eisenschiml scoured the records concerning the 
assassination and found disturbing evidence. One line from 
John Wilkes Booth’s diary was particularly interesting: ”1
have almost a mind to return to Washington and. . .clear my 
name, which I feel I can do.”*' Several things made this 
even more suspicious in Eisenschiml’s eyes. Booth’s diary 
was delivered to Stanton immediately after his capture and 
then ’’lost” or ’hidden” by Stanton in the War Department 
files for two years, until the trial of John Surratt in 
1867. Additionally, John Wilkes Booth was shot at 
Garrett’s barn against strict orders -to the contrary, and 
was not interviewed during his lingering death there.
Eisenschiml, moreover, felt that Booth’s escape from 
Washington raised the most serious questions about 
Stanton’s involvement. Stanton vigorously prevented his 
telegraph office Major Thomas T. Eckert, from attending 
Ford’s Theater with Lincoln on the night of the 
assassination. Eckert was a very strong individual and 
would have provided Lincoln with extra protection. John F. 
Parker, who was to guard Lincoln’s box and who left his 
post before the assassination to have a drink in a nearby 
tavern, remained on the White House guard force without any
23
investigation into vhis negligent behavior. He was
dismissed, significantly, in 1868 after Stanton left office
2
for minor violations of police protocol.
Other strange things occurred on that fateful night. 
Booth was allowed to cross the Navy Yard bridge into 
Maryland without hesitation. His closest pursuer, a 
stableman chasing Davy Herold for stealing a horse, was 
turned back by a warning that he would not be allowed back 
across the bridge if he continued. This stableman's story, 
given to the authorities just after midnight, was not 
treated by them as a possible clue to Booth's escape route. 
His route, which was the most obvious one to the south since 
it had fewer troop garrisons stationed along it, was left
unpatrolled. Moreover, the Federal forces in southern 
Maryland were the last to receive instructions concerning 
the pursuit of Booth. Stanton then delayed the 
transmission of Booth's name to the newspapers for a full 
two hours after it became clear that Booth was the 
assassin. Finally, when one officer found Booth's trail in 
southern Maryland, he was recalled to Washington, and 
Stanton's most trusted lieutenants, Lafayette and Luther 
Baker of the secret service, were given the task of
3
completing the capture.
To Eisenschiml, this suggested that Stanton may have 
facilitated Booth's escape and then had him killed to keep 
him from talking about his accomplices in Washington. In
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support of this theory, the author offers Lafayette Bakerfs 
version of Stanton’s reaction to the news that Booth had 
been captured (he did not yet know that he had been 
killed); »’S ecretary Stanton was distinguished during the 
whole war for his coolness, but I had never seen such an 
exhibition of it in my life as at that time. He put his 
hands over his eyes, and lay for nearly a moment without 
saying a word. Then he got up and put his coat on very 
coolly.
This rather strange response was natural for a man 
about to be implicated in a crime, not for a man overjoyed 
at an assassin’s capture. Eisenschiml argued further that 
Johnson (then presumed to be a Radical) had not been an 
intended victim after all, but that conspirator George 
Atzerodt’s room at Johnson’s hotel had been set up to give 
that impression.5 This argument is buttressed by the fact 
that Booth and Herold never mentioned Johnson as a victim to 
anyone during their escape, just Lincoln and Seward. Since 
these two were considered to be the moderates of the 
Administration, Eisenschiml contended that the Radicals 
were behind the attacks, particularly, Edwin M. Stanton. 
Apparently, Atzerodt never knew of the murder plot.
Eisenschiml cited other assorted evidence to back up 
his suggestion that Stanton was involved. He argued that 
Stanton’s implication of the Confederate leadership just 
after the assssination was designed to divert attention
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from himself and that he deliberately misinterpreted the 
evidence in his possession in order to do it.6 In 
addition, the author discovered that the picture of Booth’s 
brother, Edwin, was used throughout the pursuit even though 
it bore only slight resemblance to the assassin.
Eisenschiml found this error incomprehensible and 
attributed it to deliberate design.7 Perhaps the most 
striking piece of evidence found by this historian is the 
fact that Stanton revoked the reward for the capture of 
John Surratt in late 1865 after he had received a petition 
from someone who knew where Surratt was and who wanted him 
extradited from Great Britain.8
Other suspicious tidbits were uncovered by Eisenschiml 
as well. Various portions of testimony were edited from 
the official records of the trial of the conspirators, 
including information which indicated that the War Office 
knew of plots by Booth and others as early as March, 1865. 
Also the author found it curious that Booth was buried 
secretly in a midnight ceremony, with minimal examination 
of the body for identification and few witnesses.
In the case of Mary Surratt, Eisenchiml went further 
in his accusations, using the same kind of circumstantial 
evidence, ironically, that was used to convict the 
conspirators at the trial. He claimed that Surratt, whom 
he considered to have been innocent, was executed because, 
on the day of the assassination, she was known to have
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spoken to Booth twice. "This probably was the poor woman’s 
real guilt in the eyes of the War Department. To remove 
her forever was doubtless considered a matter of self- 
preservation for the high Unknown [Booth’s accomplice]— if 
there was such a person— who had used the assassin as his 
pawn.”9 Eisenschiml was careful to qualify his hypothesis 
with the following words: ’’There is not one point in this
summary that can be proven; it is all hypothesis. . .In view 
of all facts known at this time, an indictment against 
Stanton cannot be sustained for lack of material 
evidence."^ With that caveat, Eisenschiml initiated one 
of the most prolonged debates concerning the assassination 
since that event and one that continues in the public mind 
today.
Helen Jones Campbell, author of a book charging that 
Mary Surratt had been wrongfully convicted at the trial, 
picked up on Eisenschiml’s theory about Stanton in 194-3- 
Stanton’s security measures with respect to the guarding of 
the conspirators were not extraordinary— they were 
unbelievable. Hoods were placed over the prisoner’s heads 
and they were placed in irons under heavy guard throughout 
the trial. No guard ever patrolled the same spot more than 
once, and the prisoners were kept in full view of the 
guards at all times. After reviewing these procedures and 
others like them, Campbell asked the following questions: 
’’What was it the Secretary of War feared these men might
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see? Or hear? Or tell? Against what conversation were
they hooded and bound?"11
Campbell reiterated Eisenschiml's theory that Mary
Surratt was executed to keep her from talking about Booth’s
accomplices. The following is her version:
Booth loved the sound of his own voice.
In the Surratt house it was more than 
likely he had talked with fervor and 
freedom. Booth had told Herold that 
thirty-five men high up in Washington 
were helping him. If he had told 
Herold, would he not tell the Surratts?
If he told, might he not have named 
those thirty-five assistants? Did Mrs.
Surratt know who they were? There was a 
chance.
Campbell suspected that either Stanton did not elicit the 
information from Herold concerning the accomplices or had 
it destroyed. She claimed that some War Department clerk 
carefully neglected to record ’’who had conversed with 
Booth, who it was that had changed his purpose from capture 
to death, who it was that could profit from death who could 
not profit from capture and abduction.” 13
An interesting addition to the Stanton thesis was made 
in 1961 with the publication of secret ciphers allegedly 
written by Lafayette Baker, head of the United States 
Secret Service. These ciphers were discovered by Ray Neff, 
a New Jersey chemist and Civil War buff, when he bought an 
old copy of Colburn’s United Service journal for 1864. In 
that volume, Baker had written in cipher that Stanton and 
other Union officials were behind the assassination.
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Baker’s writings suggested that he possessed papers which
would implicate those Union officials and that attempts
were made on his life to prevent their revelation. Neff’s
searches also revealed information which backed up Baker’s
claims that attempts were made on his life and that he
possibly died from arsenic poisoning. Though Baker’s
papers have yet to be found, the ciphers contributed a key
element to Eisenschiml’s arguments. Baker wrote that Major
Thomas Eckert arranged the tragic deed, and this was many
years before anyone else suggested that Eckert was involved.
Significance is thus added to Eisenschiml’s story about
Eckert’s refusal to attend the theater with Lincoln.14
Theodore Roscoe’s The Web of Conspiracy in 1959 picked
up on the Eisenschiml theme as well. ”We know there were
unscrupulous leaders in Washington making a tremendous
underground drive for power,” Roscoe wrote. He argued that
substituting a body for Booth’s at Garrett’s barn would
have been quite possible. While contending that the case
surrounding the assassination had not been fully accounted
for by historians, Roscoe said that ’’when dealing with
powerful and unscrupulous men who would connive at the
murder of a President— with secret agents and hidden
conspirators— with military opportunism and governmental
secrecy— who can say an escape was not rigged, a
1 5substitution was impossible?”
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Other writers on the assassination have not been as
quick to accept Eisenschiml’s approach. Lloyd Lewis' Myths
After Lincoln argued that strange events like the hasty
autopsy of Booth on April 27th and the midnight burial were
inevitable in such a chaotic situation. Booth’s midnight
burial was no more than an attempt to prevent further
attacks by Southern fanatics, triggered by a formal burial
of their martyr.16 George S. Bryan’s The Great American
Myth, published in 194-0, attacked the Eisenschiml thesis as
well. Bryan faulted Eisenschiml for claiming that Stanton
delayed on the night of the assassination: "The whole
suggestion that the Secretary of War was particeps criminis
in the accomplishing of Lincoln’sdeath, and that he hoped
to make it possible for Booth to escape before a general
1 7alarm could be given, is as inapt as it is malicious.”
Bryan argued that Stanton was simply being careful in 
dispensing information because he knew of the wild 
excitement which prevailed throughout the city. Further, 
Stanton could not have kept Booth’s name secret anyway as 
several wire services were sending in independent reports 
on the affair.^
Other historians concur in the two preceding 
interpretations. Hal Higdon exonerates Stanton of 
complicity in The Union vs. Dr. Mudd. Surratt and Mudd 
were not sacrificed to keep them quiet, Higdon argues, but 
they were the victims of a vengeful Stanton out to exact
30
retribution on those who aided the Confederate cause.
Thus, Stanton’s manipulation of evidence at the trial and 
other underhanded dealings were directed towards purely 
personal and partisan goals.19 James Bishop’s The Day 
Lincoln Was Shot sees a fearful Stanton trying "to stop the 
pending assassinations rather than apprehending the 
perpetrators."20 As a result, Stanton’s attempts to 
capture Booth might have seemed lackadaisical.
One of the most recent writers on the assassination, 
Thomas R. Turner, also takes exception to the Eisenschiml 
thesis. In Beware the People Weeping. Turner suggests that 
Eisenschiml "creates unwarranted doubts" by asking a series 
of provocative questions on minor aspects of the affair and
thus "the question oftentimes becomes more important than 
the answer."21 Turner addressed the question of whether 
Stanton delayed in sending out information on Booth the 
night of the assassination. "Rapid and ill-thought-out 
dispatches to the newspapers might have had the very effect 
on people that Stanton has been accused of fostering 
anyway, of arousing them to frenzy, especially the a r m y . "22
With respect to why Stanton endeavored to cover up the 
government’s prior knowledge of plots against Lincoln, as 
Eisenschiml suggested, Turner claims that the War 
Department was simply embarrassed by its failure to follow 
up on all of the reports brought to it every day in large 
numbers.23 Turner also defends Stanton’s concealment of
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Booth’s diary. He accepts Stanton’s 1867 claim that the
Booth diary was not revealed for use at the trial because
’there was nothing in the diary which I could conceive
would be testimony against any human being."24- Stanton and
Turner are right, of course. The diary would not have
testified against anyone, rather it would have effectively
exonerated Arnold, McLaughlin, Surratt, and Mudd since it
paints the assassination as a last-minute decision by
Booth. Booth wrote in that diary on the 14-th that "until
today nothing was ever thought of sacrificing to our
25country’s wrongs.”
Turner’s major point was that Stanton had not stirred 
up anti-Southern sentiment and vengenance after the 
assassination. The North, in fact, believed that the 
Confederate leadership and its symphathizers in the North 
(Surratt and Mudd) had something to do with the 
assassination. "Under the circumstances, it is not likely
that Stanton could have charged [sic] public opinion if he
2 6had wished to, and admittedly he had no such desire." 
Unfortunately, Turner contradicts himself later in the 
book. After discussing some of the flimsy evidence Stanton 
and his underlings had dredged up, including a cipher used 
by Confederate secret agents in Canada, Turner concludes 
that "the evidence given about the cipher convinced many 
people that there was a connection between Booth and the 
Richmond Government."27 jn short, Stanton played a large
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role in forming public opinion. When Turner discusses the 
perjured evidence manufactured by Stanton to implicate the 
conspirators, he claims that "with the public so persuaded, 
it is not unusual that the military commission handed down 
the sentences that it did."^8 Turner contradictions do 
little to help Stanton’s cause.
The most recent book on the assassination is William
Hanchett’s The Lincoln Murder Conspiracies, published in
1983. It is a much-needed and thorough attempt to demolish
many of the theories and legends associated with the
assassination. The Eisenschiml thesis was one of the
targets Hanchett concentrated upon. Hanchett went far in
pointing out the flawed basis of Eisenschiml’s methodology
and highlighted areas in which that author’s speculations
were groundless. Yet it is interesting that Hanchett found
it most difficult to eliminate speculation about Stanton
entirely. The problem consisted of explaining many of
Stanton’s actions within the context of rationality.
Hanchett’s conclusion, then, about Stanton was that a study
of the man ought to be undertaken with a view towards
explaining his actions, and thus strike the final blow to
29
speculations about Stanton's actions.
Other accounts involving Stanton have appeared from 
time to time, but many of them involve serious flaws and 
historical errors and need not be mentioned here. This 
thesis proposes to extend the debate summarized in this
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chapter and perhaps end the arguments about Stanton’s 
complicity forever. The historians since Eisenschiml have 
done a good job of eliminating some of the minor points 
against Stanton, but they have not succeeded in 
satisfactorily accounting for Stanton’s behavior generally. 
This thesis offers a hypothesis that attempts to understand 
Stanton’s actions without charging him with complicity 
in the murder of Abraham Lincoln.
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CHAPTER II 
STANTON AND THE PARANOID STILE
”It is an indisputable though neglected fact that by 
the 1850’s conspiratorial imagery had become a formalized 
staple in the political rhetoric of both North and South, 
appropriated by eminent statesmen and journalists as well as 
by fanatics.””^ Fear, insecurity, and paranoia, in many 
ways dominated antebellum America. Richard Hofstadter, 
author of the above quotation, and other historians have 
found periodic instances of this phenomenon throughout 
American history.
Obvious signs of fear and insecurity became apparent 
during the antebellum period. Anti-Masonic and anti- 
Catholic movements were symbolic of this fact, the 
political expression of the two being the Anti-Masonic 
party and the Know Nothing party. But the so-called Slave 
Power conspiracy of the 1850Ts was the most prominent 
indication of such paranoia. The Slave Power Conspiracy 
theory and other conspiratorial fears probably resulted 
from ’’anxiety over the problem of preserving a consistent 
sense of national identity in the face of rapid social 
change.”2 As a result, the evidence suggests that the 
image of an ’’expansive, subversive force was a means of
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articulating individual and communal anxieties over being 
duped and slipping behind" in a rapidly changing wo r l d . 3
The Northern fear of the Slave Power was often 
exhibited in Biblical imagery direct from the Book of 
Revelation, the Slave Power being a kind of anti-Christ.
Run by a clique of 350,000 slaveholders, this 
"organization" was a "giant parasite, a plague, a poisonous 
plant, a dragon, a monster" to be eliminated at all costs.4 
Subtly controlling the nation’s destiny and sapping it of 
its moral fiber, the Slave Power sought to extend its 
stranglehold over all the states of the Union.
On the part of Southerners, the fear of an 
abolitionist conspiracy was very real. The emigrant aid 
societies of Kansas, for example, "confirmed Southern fears 
that abolitionist conspirators had nearly gained control of 
the North and would not stop until they had seized the 
federal government."5 The imagery was just as powerful 
too, the societies being described as "dark, hidden, and 
sly."6
Perhaps it is not surprising, then, that out of this 
social milieu would arise a Union Secretary of War with an 
abiding fear of conspiracy directing against the national 
government. Edwin M. Stanton, Lincoln’s Secretary of War, 
displayed several characteristics common to many of his 
countrymen. The Secretary was not unique when considered 
in the light of his environment, one permeated by fear and
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insecurity. Using Stanton as a typical spokesman for the 
conspiratorial mindset of his day, we can better understand 
his own actions and those of his peers.
Hofstadter describes the spokesman of this "paranoid
style" as finding such conspiracies "directed against a
nation, a culture, a way of life whose fate affects not
himself alone but millions of others."7 Further
the exposer of conspiracies necessarily 
adopts a victimized self-righteous tone 
which masks his own meaner interests. . . 
accusations of conspiracy conceal or 
justify one’s own provocative acts. . . 
still worse, they lead to overreactions, 
particularly to degrees of suppressive 
violence, which normally would not be
tolerated.8
Stanton fits this description very well.
Contemporaries found him to be an inveterate believer in 
hidden conspiracies and shadowy enemies. Also, they 
described him as being a harsh, vindictive opponent of 
those he defined as enemies and conspirators against the 
Union. The extent of Stanton’s fear of such conspirators, 
acts to a certain extent, as a barometer for the harshness 
and intolerable nature of Stanton’s behavior. For if the 
threat was as widespread, dangerous, and ruthless as 
Stanton believed it to be, then it was necessary to tear up 
the roots of disloyalty and punish the conspirators so 
harshly that they would never do anything similar again. 
James G. Blaine, a Radical Republican ally, described 
Stanton in the following way:
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The extinction of the Rebellion by 
force— that was his task, and no fateful 
destiny ever moved more inexorably than 
he in its performance. He could see and 
hear and know nothing else; whatever 
would help he used, and whatever would 
hinder was ruthlessly thrust by. Though 
the earth. . .was covered with dead men, 
he saw them not; though the bosom of the 
storm discharged fire and blood and 
gobbets of human flesh he seemed 
unconscious of it.9
Other contemporaries agree, to a surprising extent, on 
the many features of Stanton's personality. Secretary of 
the Navy Gideon Welles, admittedly a political enemy, was 
the most perceptive observer of Edwin Stanton. He 
described the War Secretary as filled with panics and 
alarms, often dreading dark and hidden conspiracies. 
Moreover, Stanton was a harsh and vindictive man who rarely 
let the niceties of law and procedure stand in his way. 
Stanton was very energetic, too, and this contributed to 
his successful handling of the demanding chores of the War 
Department. This energy, of course, could be used in 
battering opponents and enemies as well.
Treachery was something nearly everyone saw in Edwin 
Stanton, and it appears to have been one of his favorite 
devices for destroying the pervasive rebel conspiracy. 
Described as "sly" by one of his biographers, Stanton often 
engaged in behind-the-scenes maneuvering to oust opponents 
like General George B. McClelland 0 Politically moderate 
Hugh McCulloch remarked that "Stanton is false and
1 1treacherous, and. . .a steady spy upon all of us."
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Governor William Dennison of Ohio, a steadfast Radical,
labelled Stanton a charlatan, having known him for twenty-
five y e a r s . * '^ General David Hunter, also in the Radical
Camp, told Salmon Chase that he had seen Stanton but once,
’’and was then so treated that I never desired to see him
again. [I] think from facts that have come to my knowledge
that he is not s i n c e r e . " * ' 3 General McClellan, a mortal
enemy of Stanton’s after the Peninsula campaign, agreed in
vivid language:
I think that he is the most unmitigated 
scoundrel I ever knew, heard or read of;
I think that had he lived in the time of 
the Savior, Judas Iscariot would have 
remained a respected member of the
fraternity of the Apostles, and that the
magnificent treachery and rascality of 
E. M. Stanton would have caused Judas to 
have raised his arms in holy horror and 
unaffected wonder. 4
Everyone agreed as well that Stanton could be cruel
and vengeful towards those he defined as enemies of the
nation. Perhaps the most impressive feature of
the contemporary views of Stanton, however, is their
striking similarity. In summary, one need only read the
description of Stanton’s trusted lieutenant and supporter
General Ethan A. Hitchcock:
My chief is narrow-minded, full of 
prejudices, exceedingly violent, 
reckless of the rights of others, often 
acting like a wild man in the dark, 
throwing his arms around, willing to hit 
anybody, so he hits somebody, and makes 
a big stir. His idea of energy is 
altogether physical. He is coarse in
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his use of language, and his dislikes 
are mere prejudices— not founded upon 
any proper knowledge of character or of 
the profession of which he is the legal 
head. ' ^
These characterizations of Stanton, as developed in the 
following pages, can be attributed in part to Stanton’s own 
personal qualities, as distinguished from the more 
generalized fears of his countrymen. Whitelaw Reid, for 
example, was one contemporary observer who attributed 
Stanton's "paroxysms of passion" in the War Department to 
his poor health. Reid noted that these outbursts of hate 
and anxiety had become more prevalent by 1865 as the chores 
of the Department weighed more heavily upon Stanton.^ The 
following comment by Thomas Kirkbride, a psychiatrist, 
reveals the extent to which the labors of the War 
Department may have affected Stanton’s mental capacity:
"It was very touching to have him tell us, as medical men, 
devoted to brain troubles, how his head was often affected, 
after work that no man ought to have u n d e r t a k e n ."17
Stanton suffered throughout most of his life from a 
severe case of asthma. Attacks often left him prostrated 
for days. When considering Stanton in light of the 
paranoid style characteristic of his day, it should be 
noted that his asthma may have played a major role in 
intensifying his anxiety about contemporary events. 
Psychiatric researchers have uncovered personality 
tendencies characteristic of asthma patients. One writer
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has found that ’’personality patterns present in asthma
patients indicate a greater than average incidence of
personality problems.”^  In addition, asthmatics "showed a
trend toward more anxiety, depression, guilt and disgust- 
1 9shame.”
Psychiatric research has found that "intense emotional
states, such as panic and fear, accompany acute asthmatic
episodes" and continue in the general personality of the
patient.^0 The patients with severe cases often
present themselves as more depressed. . . 
more suspicious and guarded than others, 
more likely to feel that their life is 
currently more of a burden than others, 
more likely to feel alienated from 
others, more likely to have a higher 
activity level than others and more 
likely than other patients to be 
socially introverted.21
As the rest of this thesis will demonstrate, Stanton
possessed many, if not all, of these characteristics. The
asthmatic basis for his personality of fear and paranoia
can only be inferred or suggested. Stanton’s medical
history, however, can serve as one explanation for
Stanton’s personality.
Early in the War Secretary’s life, several instances 
of peculiar behavior reflect demonstrable indications of 
paranoia and extreme anxiety. In 1833, cholera struck 
Stanton’s community in Ohio and Ann Howard, one of his 
close friends, died less than two hours after coming down 
with the disease. She was buried immediately to prevent
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the contagion from spreading. Stanton, who had seen Howard 
at lunch, could not believe, at dinnertime, that she was 
dead. "Requesting two young friends to assist him, he 
proceeded to her grave, and, with his life in his hands, 
exhumed and opened the casket in order to be sure that she 
had not suffered the awful agony of burial alive."22 This 
account has not been fully corroborated, however.
The high level of irrational fear and insecurity 
demonstrated on that occasion was followed a decade later 
by another strange reaction to death. Stanton's child, 
Lucy, died, and William Stanton Buchanan, a relative, 
reported that Stanton, "after she had been buried about a 
year he exhumed the tiny remains, placed the ashes in a 
metal box made for that purpose."23 This box he kept in 
his room until he buried it a year later with his wife.
The death of his wife in 184-4- threw Stanton into 
uncontrollable grief. One observer wrote that Stanton 
"sent his gardener, Alfred Taylor, to guard like a soldier 
the resting-place of his idolized wife."24 A friend 
reported that Stanton at night "would leave his room, tears 
streaming from his eyes, and taking a lamp, search the 
house, crying over and over ’Where is Mary.’"25
Fear and depression, which psychiatrists have found to 
be intertwined in asthma patients, occurred at other times 
in Stanton's prewar career, especially when confronted with 
death. Stanton’s brother committed suicide in 1846 by
ustabbing himself in the throat. An observer of that awful
scene recalled the moment:
Edwin M. Stanton came over at once, but 
on seeing how terrible the happening 
was, lost self-control and wandered off
into the woods without his hat or coat. . .
Dr. Sinclair, fearing a second suicide, 
ordered Know and Sam Filson to watch him 
every moment.26
William Brown eventually chased and caught Stanton in his
flight through the woods and Stanton never tried suicide.
The Mexican War provided the future War Secretary another
opportunity to display intense depression. When the
Steubenville Grays prepared to leave for the war, "Stanton
drew wills for them, or gave advice as to arranging their
personal affairs" in case of death in battle.27
If Stanton’s prewar career exhibited problems with
death, the onset of the war in 1861 triggered a tremendous
amount of fear and insecurity. Beginning in December,
1860, Stanton pleaded with other officials to understand
the potential danger secessionists posed to them personally
and to the country. A. E. H. Johnson, a friendly
subordinate, wrote that Stanton told President James
Buchanan "that the ground was mined all around and under
him, ready to explode, and, without prompt and energetic
action, he would be the last President of the United
p o
States."
Stanton’s preoccupation with secessionist intrigue was 
quite remarkable and exceeded that displayed by any other
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high Union official. Hyman and Thomas1 account of a meeting 
between Charles Sumner and Stanton on January 25, 1861 is 
graphic:
Stanton drew Sumner into his office.
Then glancing around at the clerks, he 
took him through six different rooms and 
finding them all occupied, finally led 
him into the entry. 'He told me that he 
was surrounded by secessionists— who 
would report in an hour to the 
newspapers any interview between us—  
that he must see me at some other time 
and place— that everything was bad as 
could be.29
At about the same time, Stanton assured Salmon Chase that 
"while companies of armed men were indeed nightly drilling 
in the city and were 'ready at a signal to overthrow the 
government' the President did not believe there was 
danger."30
By June, 1861, Stanton was very afraid, writing an old 
friend in Ohio that he could not leave his home in 
Washington "with the enemy still at our gates."31 Yet he 
saved his principal fears for his tenure as Secretary of 
War. One rigid policy of the War Department under his 
leadership was to prohibit Northern-born Southerners from 
fleeing the Confederacy into Union lines. The reason for 
this was that all of these people were the "very worst 
traitors and spies we have in the Northern states." Nearly 
every one "permitted to come North is now acting the part 
of copperhead and traitor and the women are the worst of 
a l l . "32 Stanton was overly concerned with possible
4.6
agitators and infiltrators, as he believed that a
treasonable conspiracy conceived at the 1860 Charleston
convention "existed to take over the North rather than
►
merely remove the South from the Union."33 Stanton’s 
countrymen shared this particular fear with him, as 
evidenced later by exotic accounts of the Copperhead 
movement.
March, 1862 brought a terrified outburst from Stanton 
during the Merrimac incident. In the hours after the 
Merrimac’s attack on the Union fleet in Hampton Roads, 
Lincoln met with his Cabinet. At this meeting, Stanton 
predicted that the Merrimac would destroy every Union naval 
vessel and "go to New York and Boston and destroy those 
cities, or levy from them contributions sufficient to carry 
on the war."34- Gideon Welles, at whom Stanton raved for 
allowing such a disaster to happen, described the scene 
vividly:
There was throughout the whole day 
something inexpressibly ludicrous in the 
wild, frantic talk, action, and rage of 
Stanton as he ran from room to room, sat 
down and jumped up after writing a few 
words, swung his arms, scolded and raved 
. . . Both he [Lincoln] and Stanton went 
repeatedly to the window and looked down 
the Potomac. . .to see if the Kerrimac 
was not coming to Washington.-^
Orville Browning relates the Secretary’s novel and 
truly ludicrous solution to the Merrimac problem: "He told
me that he had. . .30 canal boats loading with stone to be 
sunk in the channel of the river."36 Lincoln later
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facetiously referred to this group of boats resting idly at
the Potomac’s edge as ’’Stanton’s Navy.” Stanton even
telegraphed New York for the immediate construction of an
ironclad at whatever cost to run down and sink the
Merrimac, though one was already under construction.
Welles’s assurances during the day that the Merrimac did
not have the ability to leave Hampton Roads did little to
assuage the War Secretary. It is perhaps fortunate for the
Union Navy and Potomac River navigation that Welles was in
charge of naval affairs, instead of the ’’fearfully
37stampeded Stanton,” as John Hay described him.
Other occurrences of a similar nature affected Stanton 
in the same way. On the morning of August 30, 1862,
Stanton received word that General John Pope was wrapping 
up a victory on the battlefield of Second Manassas. 
Nevertheless, he had the more important papers in the War 
Department gathered into bundles, ready to be carted to 
safety. Moreover, the Secretary ordered the arms and 
ammunition in the Wshington arsenal shipped to New York as 
soon as possible.38 ^he fact that Stanton issued these 
orders while thinking Pope had won may be less remarkable 
than the fact that the munitions were essential for the 
defense of the capital.
Fear could also get in the way of logical decision­
making. On June 30, 1863, Stanton sent a dispatch to Chief 
of Staff Henry Halleck to ’’see that every possible means of
4-8
security is adopted against any sudden raid or incursion of 
the enemy, by day or by night.” Stanton suggested that 
increased security could be had by planting batteries along 
the roads to and within Washington.^9 Halleck’s answer 
reflected the sheer irrationality of the suggestion, noting 
the elaborate fortifications and artillery positions 
already in place: ”1 know of no military officer who would
approve of such a disposition. "4-0
One minor instance in the fall of 1863 exhibits the 
panic which could sweep over Stanton’s personality at any 
moment. Travelling west to confer with Grant, Stanton 
stopped at a Tennessee hotel, the arranged meeting place. 
Though nothing of military importance was occurring,
Stanton became excited upon not finding Grant at the hotel. 
In Grant’s words, "finding that I was out, he became 
nervous and excited, inquiring of every person he met—  
including guests of the house— whether they knew where I 
was, and bidding them find me."^
Other isolated instances exhibit panic reactions on 
the part of the Secretary. When John Yates Beall and 
others captured The Philo Parsons on Lake Erie in 
September, 1864, Stanton erupted. Welles wrote that the 
Secretary feared "all our vast shipping on the Lakes was at 
its mercy." That he overstated the problem posed by this 
merchant vessel was obvious to Welles, who wrote in his 
diary that Stanton was "always in an excited panic, a
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sensational condition, at such t i m e s . T h e  complexity of 
Stanton’s character, however is such that not every 
critical event' would set off a panic reaction. For 
instance, in July of 1864* when Jubal Early’s raid on the 
capital posed the greatest threat to the city since First 
Manassas, Stanton approached the situation soberly. In 
fact, he did so to an extent that Welles felt compelled, to 
comment on it.43 Perhaps, however, such instances could be 
explained by attributing them to depression on Stanton’s 
part (one characteristic found in severe asthmatics), which 
made disaster often seem inevitable.
Stanton’s paranoia was most evident with respect to 
his personal safety. This became especially apparent 
toward the end of the war. John Hay and President Lincoln, 
for example, were surprised one October night in 1864 when 
they arrived at the War Department and found that building 
"in a state of preparation for siege,” it being impossible 
even to send a card to Stanton.4-4 A remarkable message 
from General Grant to the Secretary in March, 186$, reveals 
the extent to which Stanton felt insecure, both about 
himself and the city of Washington. Grant’s dispatch 
questioned whether ’’there was not a great mistake made in 
keeping a large number of Cavalrymen posted through the 
city of Washington.” He went on to comment that at least 
half the cavalry in the district of Washington was being 
wasted in duties "in no way tending to the protection of
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the place.” Grant assured Stanton that there was not the 
slightest need for apprehension, that ”there is not the 
slightest danger of the enemy attempting to cross the 
Potomac.”45
The events of April, 186$, only served to redouble 
Stantonfs fear of being assassinated by the great, hidden, 
treacherous conspiracy that he had fought so hard for four 
years. He obviously feared that, as a consistent and 
unbending foe, he was targeted for death. General Sherman 
learned from his brother Senator John Sherman, a neighbor 
of Stanton’s, that Stanton had been frightened by the 
assassination. When the general appeared at Stanton’s 
house a month after the assassination, he found a strong 
military guard around it and the houses of other prominent 
officials. ”A sense of insecurity pervaded Washington, for 
which no reason existed.
Just weeks after the assassination, Stanton ordered 
the prosecution of Horace Greeley and the owners of the New 
York Tribune for suggesting that a vacancy was about to 
occur in the War Office. Stanton described Greeley’s 
editorial remarks as an effort "to incite assassins to 
finish their work by murdering me and. . .1 shall not allow 
them to have me murdered and escape responsibility without 
a struggle for life on my part.”47 Gideon Welles was privy 
to many of Stanton’s irrational comments in Cabinet 
meetings and described him at this time as "full of
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apprehension and stories and plots and c o n s p i r a c i e s . " ^  As 
late as August 1 8, 1 865, Welles wrote in his diary that 
Stanton had a guard around his house and rarely ventured 
out without a stout man to accompany him. In addition, 
Stanton sought to impose his fears on President Andrew 
Johnson, bringing forward "singular papers relating to 
conspiracies, and dark and murderous designs in which he 
had evident faith. "4-9
Clearly, Stanton felt that rebel conspirators and 
their allies surrounded him, even after the war was over.
He also overestimated their potential power, as is revealed 
in Grant’s March, 1865 dispatch. These two facts led the 
War Secretary to be intensely secretive in all of his 
actions. The treatment of state prisoners is a case in 
point. When Samuel Bowles, a leader implicated in 
treasonous activities in the Northwest, was arrested, he 
was not only placed in irons but his guards were ordered to 
"take every precaution necessary to prevent escape or 
r e s c u e . "50 This dispatch, typical for War Department 
orders of this kind, reveals an inordinate concern with 
rescue. Considering the strict security with which such 
prisoners were kept, only a paranoiac would be concerned 
with rescue. Even Jefferson Davis1 private secretary, 
Burton Harrison, was prevented "from having communication, 
verbally or in writing, with any person whomsoever, without 
permission from this D e p a r t m e n t ."51 Again, in Harrison’s
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case, the war was over. Apparently, the powerful hidden 
conspiracy remained potent in Stanton's mind, enough to 
stage rescues behind Union lines.
With potent conspirators still at large, secretiveness 
was indispensable. The arrival of the captured Confederate 
President at Fort Monroe in May, 1865, provides a good 
example. In a conference with Grant and Welles, Stanton 
urged them to tell no one of Davis' arrival. "Stanton said 
no word could get abroad. He had the telegraph in his own 
hands and could suppress everything. Not a word should 
p a s s . The interrogation of the conspirators and others 
involved in the assassination of Lincoln was also highly 
secretive. Stanton chastised Provost Marshal MacPhail of 
Baltimore for allowing "an examination of Samuel Arnold to 
be taken and made known to any one, before it was reported 
to this D e p a r t m e n t . "53 Subordinates were allowed little 
freedom and all information gathered had to be given to the 
Secretary before the case against the conspirators 
proceeded f u r t h e r .54- Of course, Mary Surratt and her 
fellow prisoners were not allowed to speak without 
permission.
Stanton revealed his secretiveness in other ways. He 
told one subordinate that certain men could not be trusted, 
and that he watched and studied everybody. This distrust 
could lead to absurd extremes. Stanton's hold on the 
telegraph system was so tight and jealously guarded that he
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fired an operator in Tennessee upon learning that the 
officer had turned over, on direct orders, the telegraph 
key to the Commanding General of Union Armies, Ulysses S. 
Grant.55 In addition, War Department papers were so 
confidential that they had to be hidden from other 
government officers. In August, 1866, Attorney General 
Hugh McCulloch received a letter informing him that Stanton 
had abstracted important papers from the War Department and 
had hidden them at the Soldiers H o m e .56 During his famous 
struggle with President Johnson, the War Secretary 
instructed his subordinate, A. E. H. Johnson, to store the 
telegraphic record in a vault in Ford's Theatre and hide 
the key.^^
A remarkable manifestation of Stanton's suspiciousness 
was his belief that the Slave Power conspiracy had 
infiltrated the Union Army high command. In Stanton's 
mind, personal and political enemies quickly became 
traitors to the Union. His friend Blaine freely wrote in 
his memoirs of Stanton's penchant for accusing loyal 
officers of treasonous activity: "He was subject to
unaccountable and violent prejudice, and under its sway. . . 
many officers of merit and of spotless fame fell under his
r o
displeasure and were deeply wronged by him."
The treatment accorded Colonel Charles F. Stone after 
the disaster at Ball's Bluff in October, 1861, set the 
pattern of injustice. After Stanton had Stone arrested for
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allegedly allowing personal mail from secessionists to pass 
through his lines, he rejected a military trial for Stone’s 
case. Instead, he let Stone take a beating before the 
Committee on the Conduct of the War, whose meetngs were 
held in secret and controlled by Radical Republicans.
Stone was not allowed to hear the charges against him and 
never stood a chance against his Radical accusers on the 
Committee.59 Stone languished in prison for an extended 
period of time without any finding of guilt. Stanton let 
this happen because he prejudged Stone to have been engaged 
in traitorous actions. When asked about the injustices 
inflicted on Stone, Stanton replied coolly: ’’Individuals
are nothing; we are contributing thousands of them to save 
the Union.”60
The case of General George B. McClellan is a 
celebrated one. T. Harry Williams has constructed a 
convincing argument that Radicals in Washington, including 
Stanton, wanted McClellan to fail during the Peninsula 
campaign because they feared that his success might lead to 
a Presidential bid (McClellan being a moderate Democrat).
To that end, General Irvin McDowell, more in line with 
Radical ideology, was given a separate command and crucial 
forces were withheld from McClellan to cripple his 
effectiveness. McDowell told Major General William B. 
Franklin as much at the time. Whatever the extent of the 
accuracy of Williams’ argument, one point he makes is
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completely true: "the radicals sincerely believed that
McClellan was a traitor."61 Again, political enemies were 
considered ipso facto traitors.
Stanton led his colleagues in holding these beliefs. 
Secretary of the Treasury Salmon Chase wrote in his diary' 
that Stanton had believed for some time that McClellan 
"ought not to be trusted with the command of any army in 
the U n i o n . C l o s e r  examination of Stanton’s attitude 
toward McClellan makes it apparent that the Secretary 
believed McClellan was a Southern sympathizer. Browning 
noted that Stanton "said that he did not think McClellan 
could emancipate himself from the influence of Jeff Davis, 
and feared that he was not willing to do any thing 
calculated greatly to damage the cause of secession."6.3 
Stanton picked up this fear from rumors that Jefferson 
Davis had initiated McClellan into the Knights of the 
Golden Circle before the war. The Knights of the Golden 
Circle was a highly secretive organization believed to have 
been in league with Southern secessionists. That McClellan 
was a traitor in Stanton’s mind is clear from a letter to 
an old friend in Ohio in November, 1862, which described 
McClellan and his friends as "enemies of the country."*^
In many ways, it was McClellan’s incompetence and 
failure which Stanton consistently pointed to when speaking 
of the general’s treason. The Secretary could easily have 
said what Senator Joseph McCarthy said during the Korean
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War in 1951, further demonstrating the conspiracy and
paranoia link throughout American history:
How can we account for our present 
situation unless we believe that men 
high in this government are concerting 
to deliver us to disaster? This must be 
the product of a great conspiracy. . .
What can be made of this unbroken series 
of decisions and acts contributing to 
the strategy of defeat? They cannot be 
attributed to incompetence. . . .The 
laws of probability would dictate that 
part of. . .the decisions would serve 
this country’s interest.6$
General Robert Milroy suffered in this way when his command 
was captured during Lee’s advance into Pennsylvania in 
June, 1863. Upon learning of the capture, Stanton remarked 
to several officers in the War Office that Milroy had not 
seen a fight or an enemy before surrendering. This came in 
spite of the fact that an officer from the scene had just 
told Stanton differently. Observer Welles wondered why the 
Secretary ’’wished to misrepresent and belittle M i l r o y .  ” 6 6
General William S. Rosecrans faced similar accusations 
after the Battle of Chickamauga. John Hay reported in his 
diary that while telegraph operators were deciphering the 
first news of Roscrans' defeat, Stanton burst out with his 
own judgment: ”1 know the reasons well enough. Rosecrans
ran away from his fighting men. . .He (McC— ) and C—  both 
made pretty good time away from the fight to Chattanooga, 
but Rosecrans beat them both.”67
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Perhaps it should be mentioned in connection with 
Rosecrans the allegation that Stanton was violently anti- 
Catholic. Knowing as we do the social milieu from which 
Stanton came, the charge is hardly exceptional. Catholicism 
was viewed as a great conspiracy by many in the 19th 
century, perhaps second only to the Slave Power as a 
dangerous force sapping the strength of the Republic. 
Catholics were pawns of the Pope, an anti-democratic 
manipulator of a world-wide network. The Republican Party 
gained much of its strength from those who displayed violent 
nativistic sentiments just before the war, anti-Catholicism 
being one such sentiment. Though Stanton was not a formal 
member of the Republican Party, he shared many of its
views. It would not be surprising if he saw Catholics 
linking their conspiratorial aims with those of the rebels, 
thus making the treasonous conspiracy against the Union all 
the more hideous.
General Rosecrans was a Catholic and his orderly, M.
J. Patton, has written that his superior was refused more 
men and then relieved after Chickamauga because Stanton 
feared that a Rosecrans victory could make him the first 
Catholic president. Patton relates a conversation between 
Stanton, Halleck, and a Colonel Moose in which Stanton and 
Halleck disapproved of ntoo many priests” around Rosecrans 
and that f,it would be better to have a defeat than have a
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Catholic President."^ 8 Corroboration is scarce on this, 
however.
Another general wronged by Stanton was General 
Sherman, whom the Secretary thought to have designs upon 
the government (again, Sherman was a moderate). When 
Sherman submitted his initial agrement with General Joseph 
Johnston in April, 1865, for the latter's surrender, 
Stanton and the Cabinet felt that it had gone beyond mere 
military questions. Stanton’s official response, however, 
was inexcusable. Releasing to the press the information 
that the agreement had been disapproved, Stanton included 
only the first part of Grant’s dispatch discussing the 
problems with the agreement. He omitted the last part 
explaining why Sherman had granted Johnston such favorable 
terms. In addition, Stanton's own dispatches to the press 
indicated that the faulty agreement had given Jefferson 
Davis time to e s c a p e . S h e r m a n  rightly protested this 
action to Grant, claiming that it had ’’invited the dogs of 
the press to let loose upon me."70
But that was not all. Stanton had Halleck send 
Generals Meade, Sheridan, Wright, Wilson and others orders 
"to pay no regard to any truce or orders of General Sherman 
respecting hostilities."71 Sherman was effectively removed 
from command. Why did this happen? The word traitor 
again made an appearance, and Stanton was the primary 
initiator of the attack. It appears he believed that a
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loyal officer was involved in treasonous actions, even 
though the war was ending. Welles wrote that Speed, 
"prompted by Stanton. . .expressed his fears that Sherman 
at the head of his victorious legions had designs upon the 
gov e r n m e n t ."72 Since Stanton felt that moderates were at 
least soft on rebels if not in league with them, slighting 
ShermanTs loyalty came easily for Stanton. Again, the fear 
of conspiracy remained the basis for the Secretary’s 
actions.
If Stanton’s implication of loyal Union officers in the 
rebel conspiracy was appalling, surely his attitude that 
President Johnson had traitorous tendencies was worse.
Much of the treachery attributed to Stanton’s actions as a
Cabinet officer can be traced to a fear of conspiracies and
hidden deals on behalf of Southern traitors. As Alphonse
Miller, a biographer of Radical Thaddeus Stevens, has
written, Stanton managed ”to reconcile patriotism to his
country with treachery to his superior officer."73
Biographers Thomas and Hyman have accurately interpreted
this tendency as resulting from Stanton’s belief that
Johnson "was Jeff Davis in another f o r m . "74 In fact, by
December, 1866, Stanton feared that President Johnson
himself "might lead a revolutionary movement to use the
Army for the purpose of unseating the Republican
75congressional majority."
60
Treachery was just one way that Stanton could attack
and defeat the Slave Power conspirators, which, in his
mind, continued to beset him and the country long after the
war. Stanton's biographers have written that when faced
with the very survival of the Union, he "would not have
scrupled to employ d e c e i t . F o r  several years, Welles
had been obsessed with Stanton’s deceitful ways, always
claiming that the Secretary was "an intriguer, courts
favor, is not faithful in his friendships, and is given to
secret underhand combinations."77 Welles also claimed that
Stanton had Johnson surrounded most of the time by his
detectives, or men connected with the military service who
were "creatures of the War Department." Thus Stanton
obtained Johnson’s confidential conversations, so that
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he could detect treason without delay.
By the end of 1865> Stanton was openly working against 
the President. His eloquent denunciation of the Tenure of 
Office Act in a Cabinet meeting in early 1 867 seemed comic 
to Welles. What Stanton said during that meeting is very 
interesting: "He protested with ostentatious vehemence
that any man who would retain his seat in the Cabinet as an 
adviser when his advice was not wanted was unfit for the 
place. He would not, he said, remain a moment."79 yet a 
few months later he would invoke the same statute to stay 
in office. The ludicrious spectacle of the War Secretary 
barricading himself in the War Department in defiance of
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Johnson shows the extent to which he believed himself to be 
beset by the minions of the Slave Power conspiracy even as 
late as 1867.
It also showed the extent to which Stanton could
display atrocious duplicity. To understand the true depth
of Stanton's insincerity, one must return to the case of
General McClellan. Stanton began his efforts to remove
McClellan sometime in February, 1862. Failing initially,
Stanton tried sending General Burnside to the Peninsula to
act as second-in-command, in "reality to control him
[McClellan] ."80 Then he offered command of the Army of the
Potomac to General Ethan Hitchcock, who refused. Still,
Stanton sent periodic reassurances of support to McClellan,
many of which were believed by that officer until June,
1862. The following, written in early July, is a good
example: "there is no cause in my heart or conduct for the
cloud that wicked men have raised between us for their own
base and selfish purposes. No man had ever a truer friend
than I have been to you and shall continue to be."81 Even
more ironic was Stanton's earnest restraint of Senator Zach
Chandler when that person was attacking McClellan in early
July: "that while the campaign was in active progress,
there was yet some hope of a change for the better, and that
to destroy confidence in a commanding officer under such
82circumstances might injure the army in the field."
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If Stanton’s charcteristic deceitfulness was related 
to his all-consuming desire to fight the great conspiracy 
with whatever means were available, then so too was his 
penchant for usurping power. Grant recorded in his memoirs 
that Stanton -had a "natural disposition to assume all power 
and control in ail matters that he had anything whatever to 
do with."8.3 Stanton often defied the President or usurped 
the powers of his office, generally when he believed 
Lincoln was being too lenient towards those who obstructed 
the goal of Union victory.
By 1863, for example, Lincoln had agreed to let 
Stanton review all of his requests for pardons before 
issuing any of them. While Lincoln was fond of making light 
of the Secretary’s defiance, Stanton assumed many of the 
functions of Lincoln’s office to a dangerous extent. As 
Grant remarked after the war, the Secretary felt no 
hesitation in assuming the duties of the Executive, or 
acting without consultation with Lincoln. To this end, as 
we have already seen, Stanton offered command of the Army 
of the Potomac to Hitchcock without consulting Lincoln. 
McClellan even wrote after the war that Stanton "often 
advocated the propriety of my seizing the government and 
taking affairs into my own hands" (early in 1862).84- So 
much contempt for Lincoln’s authority did Stanton have that 
when criticized for working behind the President’s back for 
McClellan’s removal, he blurted out that "he knew of no
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8 5particular obligations he was under to the President.”
In that comment, one grasps the essence of Stanton’s 
commitment, which was not to the President, but to the 
defeat of the great rebel conspiracy. Whatever would 
hinder him as Hitchcock remarked, was ruthlessly thrust 
aside.
While grasping for the power of others, Stanton also 
abused much of the power he rightfully possessed. Again, 
it was directed at suspected enemies of the state. When 
faced with the possibility that Maryland might reject an 
abolition policy in 1864-, Stanton used army troops to 
intimidate the opposition at the polls. They were 
stationed at the polling places to keep tabs on the voting
habits of each voter, easy enough when color-coded ballots 
were used. Biographer Hyman credits skillful maneuvers of 
this kind with the Administration party winning eighteen 
seats in the House elections of the fall of 1862.^ 6
Stanton also took the lead in punishing newspapers or 
alleged conspiratorial activity. On February 10, 1862, 
Stanton ordered Dr. Malcolm Ives of the New York Herald to 
be arrested ’and held in close custody. . .as a spy” for 
interrupting a War Department conference.^ Note that he 
was not arrested for violating Department restrictions, but 
as a spy (the paranoia is clearly evident). A month later, 
he suppressed the Washington Sunday Chronicle for reporting 
troop movements, directing that all persons connected with
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the paper, including its compositors, be arrested.88 Note 
that Stanton ordered all of the laborers connected with the 
paper arrested, as if a widespread, pervasive conspiracy 
existed.
A classic example of this same paranoia occurred in 
May, 1864., when the New York World, an opposition paper, 
published a forged Presidential proclamation, calling for 
more troops, which the editors believed to be genuine. 
Stanton’s orders to General Dix to close the paper down 
declared that the proclamation had been ’’wickedly and 
traitorously. . .published with the design to give aid and 
comfort to the enemies of the United States.”^9 jn 
addition, Stanton jumped to the conclusion that the 
telegraph company had planned the affair and had all its 
employees thrown in jail. No real evidence ever existed to 
corroborate such wild hallucinations, highlighting 
Stanton’s intense fear of conspiracy and treason.
Another way in which Stanton abused his power 
demonstrates the extent to which he believed that the Slave 
Power had a firm grip on every aspect of society. On 
November 30, 1863> Stanton ordered that ’’all houses of 
worship belonging to the Methodist Episcopal Church South 
in which a loyal minister, appointed by a loyal bishop of 
said Church, does not now officiate, are placed at the 
disposal of the Right Rev. Bishop Ames.”90 Instructions 
were given as to their listing and the finding of
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replacements. This latter process caused some problems for
Stanton, for in March, 186-4, Bishop Edwards and others of
the United Brethren Church protested Ames’ "monopoly of
churches. . .and seemed to have a hankering after a share
of the p l u n d e r ."91 Lincoln, in this case, sent a curt note
to Stanton disapproving of his unauthorized policy, saying
92
the government could not undertake to run the churches. 
Stanton continued the policy anyway.
Stanton no doubt believed that the Southern churches 
were one of the primary sources of the Slave Power 
conspiracy and needed to be cleansed of traitorous clergy. 
For those individuals against whom was brought some 
specific charge of disloyalty, Stanton advised severe
penalities. As Hyman has noted, "the internal security 
problem was deadly serious and intensely personal" for 
S t a n t o n .93 Unfortunately, disloyalty was defined within 
bounds of what some contemporaries labelled Stanton’s 
violent prejudices, hastily formed and frequently unjust. 
Welles wrote that Stanton was a Radical sensationalist, 
"ready to believe anything bad of those to whom he is 
opposed."94- Stanton’s strong actions against those accused 
of being disloyal must be seen in the light of his personal 
hatred of those involved in the conspiracy. Also, the fact 
that the conspiracy was much more widespread to Stanton 
than to others seemed to call for harsher penalties and 
greater deterrence.
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His reaction to a Coles County, Ohio, riot in 1862 is 
typical: "Every damned one of them [rioters] should be
h u n g ."95 On another occasion, when General Dix reported 
that a certain Union spy named Wood had failed to appear at 
his headquarters as ordered, Stanton sent the following 
reply: "You should have sent Wood to the guard house.
When you think any man deserves it shoot him on the 
spot."96 This kind of harsh treatment extended to 
Stanton’s treatment of Southern prisoners.
While Stanton often cut rations for the prisoners in
so-called retaliation for the treatment of Union prisoners
in the South, he also restricted rations for another
reason. On February 15> 1864, Stanton issued orders that
no food would be allowed the prisoners from sources other
than the government issue (i.e., sutlers, friends, etc.),
an act which caused needless outbreaks of scurvy and other
diseases. The ostensible reason was that such activity
"gives opportunity for sympathizers to show their interest 
97in rebels."
Stanton wanted to suppress such interest and leniency, 
for it encouraged the great conspiracy. Attorney General 
Bates writes of one instance in which Stanton opposed 
letting courts decide the ownership of confiscated Southern 
property, as required by law. Speaking with Bates about 
it, Stanton argued that a judge could not give property to 
a rebel, so no cases should be heard. Bates’ rejoinder
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that rebels could only be identified in courtroom 
proceedings infuriated Stanton: r,He resumed (rather in
furore) if the Judge should give land to a traitor he ought 
to be shot and I would give the o r d e r . ”98
The Secretary also engaged in widespread efforts to ' 
round up traitors and bring them to account for their 
activities. Arrests were widespread (as was the 
conspiracy) and arbitrary, especially in the period after 
the assassination. Stanton’s dispatches in April, 1865 are 
instructive. On April 21, 1865, for instance, Stanton 
seems to have targeted the wife of Confederate General 
Richard Ewell whom he personally ordered arrested in 
N a s h v i l l e . 99 Junius Booth was arrested by the War
Department for no other reason than that he was a relative 
of the assassin, and thus probable conspirator. George 
Gayle, a respected Alabama politician, was arrested in 
April for allegedly inciting the murder of Lincoln in an 
Alabama publication. He and Booth were not released until 
the end of June.^^
Not only do Stanton’s irrational arrests testify to 
the terror which he felt over the pervasive, widespread 
conspiracy, but his continued efforts after the trial of 
the Lincoln conspirators illustrate his belief that it was 
not yet dead. As late as June 15, 1865, Stanton persuaded 
the President to agree to a new order directing the 
Military Governor of the District of Columbia to
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arrest, examine, or hold in custody any 
person or persons in your command 
against whom you may have evidence or 
reasonable grounds of suspicion of 
treasonlike acts or correspondence with. . . 
enemies of the United States.101
Writing letters south, it seemed, was too conspiratorial
even after the end of hostilities. Stanton also came close
to instituting executions as a first blow towards
reconstruction, according to Radical Charles Sumner.
Sumner wrote John Bright in England that "it was Stanton who
wished to hang three or four in a state; I think even he is
* + n 1 0 2more moderate now."
As is apparent, punishment for rebels in the years 
after the war was not unusual, for Stanton believed that 
the conspiracy continued to be potent. It is a fact that 
Stanton deliberately withheld a telegram from General 
Absalom Baird in New Orleans in 1866 which asked Johnson 
for advice concerning the possibility of violence following 
a Union meeting. When a riot subsequently occurred,
Stanton immediately "in great excitement, repeatedly spoke 
of the Attorney General of Louisiana and the Mayor of New 
Orleans as pardoned rebels who had instigated the murder of 
the people in the streets of the city, that they are guilty 
of this terrible bloodletting."^^ Quite probably, Stanton 
was willing to sacrifice innocent lives to place odium on 
the "rebels" in Louisiana. In the same year, Stanton 
opposed efforts to provide protection for the people of 
Texas from Indian attacks. Welles saw a "lurking
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inclination on his [Stanton’s] part to slight Texas to permit 
the people to be harassed— that spirit of Radical hate and 
o p p r e s s i o n . 04 More correctly, Welles could have seen it 
as an unwillingness on the part of Stanton to show kindness 
for rebels, or be lenient in ways which might give new life 
to the rebel conspiracy.
As seen in the preceding pages, Stanton’s personality
displays an overall theme: the fear of conspiracy. Out of
this fear arose hate, secrecy, vindictiveness, deceit,
arbitrary grasping for power, and general distrust of
almost everyone. Thus, the many facets of the Secretary’s
personality relate to the whole. While many of his 
characteristics can be found in other strong Unionists of
the day, who also feared the pervasive conspiracy, Stanton 
exhibited them to a greater degree. This is reflected in 
the comment of fellow Radicals related in this chapter.
Also, the Secretary’s fears may have developed partially 
out of personal factors, asthma merely being one of them.
This chapter has shown the abiding and deep-rooted fears 
that encompassed Stanton’s personality. In part, they were 
understandable given the context of the war. More than 
that, however, they were exceptional and unique as well.
The preceding development of the Secretary’s ’’paranoid- 
style” personality permits us to examine his strange and 
suspicious actions after the assassination in the light of 
that unique personality.
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CHAPTER III 
STANTON AND THE ASSASSINATION
With this clear perspective on many aspects of 
Stanton's character and personality, it is possible to 
assess the questions raised by many historians with respect 
to the Secretary's behavior in the wake of the Lincoln 
assassination. Due to the brief nature of this thesis, it 
is not practical to reach conclusions on every point made 
by Eisenschiml and others. A general view of the prominent 
aspects of Stanton's behavior, however, clearly reveals
that his behavior was consistent with that exhibited on 
many previous occasions, especially during 1861-1865* 
Actions which may have initially struck historians as 
strange and suspicious can be understood in the light of 
Stanton's personal experience and the political environment 
of his time, which spawned similar traits and attitudes 
among others striving to save the Union.
Given Secretary of War Stanton's fearful nature, his 
reaction to the assassination of Abraham Lincoln could be 
expected to contain paranoiac elements endemic to his three 
years in the War Department and perhaps his formative years 
in Ohio. This man believed that spies and traitors had 
infiltrated the White House, the War Department, and Union
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Army high command, the churches, and the newspapers and 
swarmed through Washington and its environs. Wholesale 
assassinations were constantly on Stanton’s mind as well, so 
much so that he feared the White House might have been 
mined in January, 1861.
The assassination of Lincoln on April 1 4, 1865, no 
doubt convinced Stanton that his worst-case scenarios had 
been correct and that the situation called for decisive 
action. That action contained many of the elements already 
discussed with respect to the paranoia in the War 
Department— secrecy, deception, insecurity, overreaction, 
and vindictiveness. Decisive action also meant assuming 
power and using it harshly, in order to blunt the seemingly 
rekindled flames of rebellion and conspiracy. For Stanton, 
Lee’s surrender at Appomatox did not end the great 
conspiracy; rather it was alive, active, omnipresent, and 
still extremelly dangerous. As late as 1867, the Secretary 
had fears that President Johnson, whom he had come to see 
as a leading conspirator, might lead a revolutionary 
movement of some kind. Thus, swift measures were needed 
more than ever to save the Union and root out the remaining 
elements of the great Slave Power plot.
Fear and insecurity were obvious reactions on 
Stanton's part, as we noted in his response to Greeley's 
editorial. Other conspirators and traitors doubtless stood 
ready to finish the grisly work Booth had started. In
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fact, James Bishop has written that ’’Stanton’s function, as 
he saw it, was to stop the pending assassinations rather 
than to apprehend the perpetrators of the Lincoln 
shooting.”1 For this reason, one of Stanton’s prime 
concerns became the disposal of Booth’s body. If Booth was 
the martyr Stanton believed him to be, ’’every hair of 
Booth’s head will be a valued relic to sympathizers with the 
South in Washington.”2
Stanton ordered a hasty autopsy of Booth’s body on 
board the ironclad Montauk and instructed the commanding 
officer of the Navy Yard to ’’have the body placed in a 
strong box, and deliver it to the charge of Colonel Baker—  
the box being carefully sealed.”3 (emphasis mine) Then 
the Secretary ordered Baker to have Booth’s body buried at 
a secret place (the Arsenal grounds) at midnight. Thus 
Stanton rid himself of the danger that sympathizers might 
use Booth or his effects as relics and symbols to begin 
further assassinations or depredations. The Catholic 
imagery (relics and symbols) was an ominous sign of 
Stanton’s fears.
These same concerns revealed themselves in the 
treatment of the Lincoln conspirators, especially when it 
came to the possibility of their rescue by fellow rebel 
sympathizers. Throughout the war, political prisoners had 
been kept under heavy guard for fear of rescue by co­
conspirators in the North. If the Slave Power organization
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remained intact after Appomattox, then rescue was a 
possibility that Stanton had to foreclose. Jefferson Davis, 
captured May 10, was already being kept under heavy guard 
at Fort Monroe, including round-the-clock observers and 
manacles. The conspirators saw it get heavier in 
Washington. Since even a whisper from Mary Surratt or the 
others might ignite attacks or rescue attempts, hoods were 
placed over their heads to prevent conversation. Each 
prisoner was placed within sight of a guard at all times to 
protect against the same thing. When one realizes the 
number of men (16,000) surrounding the Arsenal grounds, one 
realizes the extent of StantonTs fear of rescue.
Secrecy, as throughout the war, was a second hallmark
of Stanton’s reaction. Only his trusted lieutenants were 
allowed to handle certain aspects of the case. Things were 
often hidden from fellow government officials. The 
apprehension of Booth by the Bakers is a good example, and 
the intense secretiveness was the probable reason why Booth 
was not interrogated as he lay dying at Garrett’s Barn. We 
have seen what such unauthorized action might bring in the 
case of Sam Arnold and Marshall MacPhail of Baltimore. 
Stanton controlled all aspects of the government’s response 
to the assassination, as was his custom in similar crises, 
and he attempted to make the conspiracy trial secret as 
well, but failed. His object would be to thwart the hidden 
enemies that surrounded the War Department and controlled
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the press, preventing them from betraying his actions to 
Southern sympathizers.
As mentioned above, Stanton naturally assumed power in 
Washington after Lincoln was shot, and exercised much of 
that power for the next several months. With an unsure 
Johnson at the helm, it was relatively easy for Stanton to 
take control of affairs. One of his first tasks was to 
arrange for a military trial of the conspirators. Since 
Stanton apparently was convinced of their guilt anyway, 
this was the surest and quickest way to dispense with them 
and get the provocative conspirators out of the public 
spotlight. As Welles wrote, "I regret they are not tried 
by the civil court. . .but Stanton, who says the proof is 
clear and positive, as emphatic.”4- Even if the civil 
courts had been quicker, Stanton no doubt believed that 
Slave Power conspirators could connive for acquittal of the 
defendants, and possibly lay new rescue plans.
Stanton also believed, however, that Davis and the 
Confederate leadership were directly involved in the 
assassination. The nature of the vast conspiracy told him 
so, and at the least, the Confederate leaders were equally 
guilty by their prominent role in carrying out that vast 
conspiracy. In fact, by five o’clock on the morning of 
April 15th, Stanton ordered officials along the Canadian 
border to arrest Jacob Thompson, Confederate commissioner to 
C a n a d a .5 By the end of April, with the persuasiveness of a
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true believer, he had convinced most; of the Cabinet that 
the assassination was just paTt of the gigantic conpsiracy 
which Davis had directed for four years.
Problems began to crop up, however. The Booth diary 
captured on the 26th of April revealed the murder plot to 
be a last-minute decision: "until today nothing was ever
thought of sacrificing to our country’s wrongs.”6 Stanton 
concealed this diary during the trial of the conspirators. 
When it was revealed in 1867, Stanton violently opposed its 
publication, for by that time his use of perjured evidence 
at the trial had become a great liability.^ He had, on 
other occasions, engaged in similar types of legal fraud. 
Stanton apparently used doctored evidence during a famous
patent case in 1859> to deprive Cyrus McCormick of his
g
right to the reaper design-
The Secretary did find witnesses willing to testify 
against Davis and Thompson, but quickly learned that their 
testimony was fraudulent. He decided to persist in his 
efforts, on the assumption that the Confederates must have 
had some role in the plot; yet many Radicals like Charles 
Sumner openly believed his former Southern colleagues 
incapable of such a deed. In part, this stemmed from the 
Secretary’s belief in the pervasiveness of the great 
conspiracy. Thus, the absence of a connection to the 
Confederate leadership would nearly have been 
incomprehensible to Stanton. If there were no direct
82
involvement of Davis and the others, as the leaders of the 
Slave Power, they were responsible for its actions anyway, 
and were as guilty as Booth of the murder of Lincoln.
Those who did not understand this would be enlightened if 
he could establish the direct connection to the Rebel 
leadership. To this end, Stanton used the perjured 
evidence of Sanford Conover and others in the conspirators’ 
trial to build his case against Davis. But when their 
testimony leaked to the public, it was quickly proven false 
by Jacob Thompson and others, using Canadian hotel records 
and other information.
Seymour Frank’s study of this issue has found that the 
Secretary used bribes and rewards to construct his story at 
the trial. Moreover, his vendetta aganst Davis continued 
into 1866. Naturally, Stanton and other Radicals did not 
believe the Slave Power could be crushed for good until 
some form of ’justice” was dealt its leadership. Stanton 
had Holt actually hire Conover to dig up witnesses against 
Davis, even though the man was a known perjurer and liar.
In 1867, the true dimensions of the witchhunt were 
revealed. Two of Conover’s witnesses admitted that they 
had received up to $6000 from the War Department for their 
testimony. Conover, for his part, felt ’’some consolation 
from the fact that several illustrious heads are as deep in 
the mud as we are in the mire.”9 It was to prevent these 
facts from coming to light in court that Stanton initially
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rejected petitions for John Surratt's extradition to the 
United States in 1865-66.10
In addition to his desire to implicate Davis and get 
the trial of the conspirators over with quickly, Stanton 
wanted convictions, as an example of what might happen to 
other potential assassins. Not only was the conspiracy 
still alive after Appomattox, but Stanton feared personal 
injury enough to have constant bodyguards as late as 
August, 1865. Mary Surratt was the absolute epitome of 
what Stanton wanted to punish and discourage. She 
symbolized the Southern sympathizer and Northern traitor, 
working behind the lines on behalf of the Slave Power. 
Moreover, she was a Catholic and a woman,- the latter group
described in one of Stanton's dispatches as the worst 
internal traitors. Beyond the fact that a friend claimed 
that Stanton did not care for women generally, Surratt could 
be made an example to all the other females carrying out 
the tradition of Rose O'Neal Greenhow, who worked on behalf 
of the conspiracy under the protection of their femininity. 11 
Surratt lived where at least the kidnapping plot 
against Lincoln was hatched and it was plausible to suspect 
her of being involved. But Stanton, an able lawyer, knew 
the evidence against her was insufficient and most probably 
non-existent. Nevertheless, he got what he needed. The 
Secretary had the cowardly Weichmann frightened into 
"remembering" additional facts about the Surratt case.
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Weichmann wrote Assistant Judge Advocate Henry Burnett on 
May 5th that "you confused and terrified me so much
1 2
yesterday that I was almost unable to say anything." 
Weichmann1 s testimony, combined with that of the equally 
terrified John Lloyd, doomed Mary Surratt. Again, fraud 
was not out of the question if rebels and traitors could be 
brought to justice. It was sad testimony indeed against 
Stanton when Weichmann told a friend after the executions 
that "it would have been very different with Mrs. Surratt 
if he had been let a l o n e ."13
Conviction was not quite enough for Stanton in his 
desire to make Surratt an example. He probably saw to it 
that the military commission’s appeal for a commutation of 
Surratt’s death sentence was never seen by President 
Johnson, though there is some dispute on this. Knowing as 
we do Stanton's penchant for controlling everything, it is 
likely that he made such efforts through Judge Advocate 
Holt. Surely a Secretary who could defy President Lincoln 
at will could engage in keeping information from Johnson. 
This coincides with Hyman’s appraisal, which noted that the 
appeal was omitted from Pitman's official record of the 
trial, a fact that Stanton must have known.14 General 
Augustus V. Kautz, a member of the military commission 
observed that "the Judge Advocates, under the influence of 
the Secretary of War, evidently, were very perservering and 
wanted to have the seven prisoners all hung."15 Harsh
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punishment for traitors was not new to Stanton and he 
apparently felt that anyone conspiring in so dangerous and 
heinous a rebellion must deserve the just and prudent 
punishment of death.
Too often historians have tried to gloss over the 
unpleasant aspects of the Secretary’s behavior, because it 
tarnishes the view we would like to have of Radicals like 
Stanton. But in this case it has undermined our 
understanding of the assassination for many years. 
Modifying our view of Stanton’s actions and personality has 
not sullied the mandate of Union victory, nor glamorized 
the images of Booth, Surratt, and Mudd. It has taught us, 
however, how good intentions are often pushed beyond their 
rational or justifiable limits and become national 
tragedies. Human behavior often has a dynamic of its own, 
and can generate impulses which deny the basic principles 
of truth and justice. While unacceptable, such impulses 
deserve profound contemplation.
In many ways, our examination of Stanton raises as 
many questions as it answers. For example, under the 
American social and political system, do those who rise to 
power reflect broader currents of psychological phenomena 
(in this case paranoia)? Can we infer from men of 
Stanton’s nature that a common psychology exists? Does the 
eventual rejection of these paranoiacs (whether they be the
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extreme Radicals or McCarthyites) suggest that the paranoid 
element is only dominant in times of perceived crises or 
danger? These and other questions, though outside the 
scope of this thesis, can be crucial to both the study of 
individual and collective psychology in American history, 
especially in eras for which there is no polling data. 
Perhaps, then, our interpretive framework for Stanton and 
the Lincoln assassination suggests similar lines of inquiry 
on a wide variety of topics in American history.
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